- ERNESTO REZK
  - DIRECTOR
- ernerezk@eco.unc.edu.ar
- INSTITUTE OF ECONOMICS AND FINANCE
  - FACULTY OF ECONOMIC SCIENCES
  - NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF CORDOBA
    - www.eco.unc.edu.ar/ief/index.htm

#### MAIN FEATURES

- ARGENTINA IS A THREE-TIERED FEDERATION
- CONSTITUTION GRANTS AMPLE TAXING AND SPENDING POWERS TO ALL THE THREE LEVELS
- SUBNATIONAL LEVELS INCLUDE 24 PROVINCES AND 1,100 MUNICIPALITIES

• IS IT ARGENTINA ONLY A 'FORMAL' FEDERATION?

- MARKED TAX COLLECTION CONCENTRATION
- FAIRLY AMPLE SPENDING DECENTRALIZATION

- VERTICAL IMBALANCE 2001
  - (million of current pesos)

• REVENUE 36,532,1 29,982,1

• SPENDING\* 35,076,8 32,487,5

• SUP-DEFIC. 1,455,3 - 2,595,4

• (\*) Exclusive of Interest Payments

- VERTICAL IMBALANCE 2001
  - (million of current pesos)

• NATION PROVINCES
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• REVENUE 36,532,1 29,982,1

• SPENDING\* 45,251,4 35,155,5

• SUP-DEFIC. - 8,719,3 - 5,263,4

• (\*) Inclusive of Interest Payments

- PROVINCIAL REVENUES 2001
  - (million of current pesos)

•	PROVINCES'OWN TAXES	9,850,8	33.1%
•	REVENUE SHARING SYSTEM	15,763,3	52.7%
•	CURRENT TRANSFERS	1,174,7	3.9%
	OTHER CURRENT REVENUES	2,672,2	8.9%
	CAPITAL REVENUES	427,1	1.4%

TOTAL REVENUES

29,892,1

#### • PROVINCIAL TAX REVENUES - 2001

• (per cent share)

•	TURNOVER TAX	55.69%
•	PROPERTY AND LAND TAX	16.83%
•	CAR TAX	8.47%
	OTHER TAX REVENUES	19.01%

HORIZONTAL FISCAL IMBALANCE - 2001

•		POPUL.	GDP	<b>GDPpc</b>	TAX	REV.
•						
•	B. Aires	13,756,0	96,965,9	7,049	3,648	0.370
•	C.of B.Aires	2,729,4	68,695,3	25,168	2,490	0.253
•	Córdoba	3,052,7	24,174,7	7,919	815	0.083
	Santa Fé	2,976,0	22,885,2	7,690	<b>781</b>	0.079
	Mendoza	1,573,7	12,140,8	7,715	357	0.036
	19 provinces	11,950,1	68,467,5	5,729	1,760	0.179

TOTAL SPENDING BY GOVERNMENT LEVEL

• NAT. GOV. PROV. MUNICIP.

Admin. Law and

• Order 56.0% 36.0% 8.0%

Social and Human

• Resources Spending 34.0% 64.0% 2.0%

• Economic Spending 57.0% 40.0% 3.0%

• Public Debt 81.0% 17.0% 2.0%

- MAIN PROBLEMS
- SUBNATIONAL LEVELS DO NOT MEET PRINCIPLE OF FINANCIAL AUTONOMY
- EXISTING INTERJURISDICTIONAL FISCAL ARRANGEMENTS DO NOT ENHANCE SUBNATIONAL LEVELS' ACCOUNTABILITY

- MAIN PROBLEMS
- CONTINUOUS 'BAIL OUT' TO SUBNATIONAL BORROWING FAVOURS UNWISE BUDGETARY BEHAVIOURS AND EXCESSIVE PUBLIC SPENDING
- PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES RUN COUNTER EFFECTIVE PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS AND SERVICES

- STOCK OF SUBNATIONAL PUBLIC DEBT 2001
  - (million of u\$s dollars)

•	<b>BUENOS AIRES</b>	6,040	TUCUMAN	1,370
	CHACO	1,660	RIO NEGRO	1,250
•	CORDOBA	1,590	MISIONES	1,200
	MENDOZA	1,410	E. RIOS	1,100
	FORMOSA	1,400	C.B.AIRES	850

• REST 8,230 TOTAL 26,100

• STOCK OF SUBNATIONAL PUBLIC DEBT IN RELATION TO REVENUES - 2001

•	<b>BUENOS AIRES</b>	66%	TUCUMAN	133%
	CHACO	179%	RIO NEGRO	184%
•	CORDOBA	66%	MISIONES	154%
	MENDOZA	104%	E. RIOS	98%
	FORMOSA	231%	C.B.AIRES	<b>26%</b>

#### • SUBNATIONAL PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 2002

•		<u>mployees</u>	E/1000	<u>∑wages/Rev</u>
•				
•	Córdoba	76,100	24.9	55.3
•	<b>Buenos Aire</b>	es 438,000	28.0	72.7
	Santa Fé	104,500	33.0	61.7
	Mendoza	63,250	35.0	64.8
	C.B.Aires	112,500	37.5	

#### • SUBNATIONAL PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 2002

•		<b>Employees</b>	E/1000	$\sum$ wages/Rev
•	Neuquen	36,500	65.2	56.9
•	Formosa	33,700	68.2	72.7
•	Catamarca	23,800	70.0	54.4
	La Rioja	23,250	89,2	60.8
	Santa Cruz	17,400	90.5	44.4
	All prov.	1,471,650	40.8	

# THE ENHANCEMENT OF FISCAL FEDERALISM IN ARGENTINA CALLS FOR THE ENSUING MATTERS TO BE URGENTLY ADDRESSED:

# A. TO MEET THE CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE OF A NEW INTER JURISDICIONAL FISCAL ARRANGEMENT

# B. TO AIM AT ENHANCING SUBNATIONAL LEVELS' ACCOUNTABILITY BY:

- INDUCING THEM TO EXERCISE THEIR FISCAL FACULTIES
- STRENGTHENING THEIR TAX COLLECTION CAPABILITIES

## C. TO INTRODUCE SOME DEGREE OF DISCIPLINE IN SUBNATIONAL BORROWING BY:

- STOPPING BAIL OUT PRACTICES
- USING SOME VARIETIES OF COOPERATIVE OR RULES-BASED APPROACHES TO SUBNATIONAL BORROWING

## D. TO IMPROVE GOVERNANCE IN SUBNATIONAL LEVELS BY INDUCING THEM TO:

• RESORT TO MORE TRANSPARENT BUDGETARY PRACTICES

• TO RELEASE RELIABLE AND COMPLETE INFORMATION ON TAX AND SPENDING FIGURES

E. TO FAVOUR UNCONDITIONAL TRANSFERS, IN PLACE OF **CONDITIONAL TRANSFERS** ('PRINCIPAL-AGENT' RELATIONS), SPECIALLY IF THE POSSIBILITY OF **OCURRENCE OF ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND** MORAL HAZARD IS HIGH