Federalism and Immigrant Integration in Canada

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Introduction

Canadian federal institutions leave a deep imprint on the policy structures of the country. Government programs in sector after sector have been shaped by one of the most complex federations among contemporary democracies, and by the intergovernmental diplomacy through which the multiple governments in Canada manage their interdependence. For much of the postwar era, immigration stood as an exception to this pattern. The central government dominated the process from the admission of newcomers through their settlement and integration to their naturalization as new citizens. In recent decades, however, the sector has been transformed by a rapid decentralization of power, with provincial authorities now exercising a substantial role in the admission and integration of immigrants. This process has not been guided by a comprehensive blueprint setting out a new integrated policy regime. Rather the transformation has proceeded through a series of partial, incremental adjustments made in response to immediate pressures. These changes have been layered on top of each other, with limited thought given to their cumulative long-term impact. The result is probably the most complex immigration system in the world, and a set of intergovernmental relations characterized by asymmetry rather than a common conception of federalism.

Canadian experience provides the raw material for a debate between two fundamental views of multi-level governance in the 21st century. The contemporary pattern will presumably be celebrated by those who see multi-level governance as a means of reducing the role of the traditional state in steering social change, who place their faith in markets and in the uncoordinated actions of independent social agents such as employers, families, and educational institutions, and who believe in the responsiveness and self-correcting capacities of local communities. For such people, the evolving Canadian immigration system is an exciting experiment in social autonomy. In contrast, the contemporary pattern deeply troubles those who have greater faith in collective decision-making in democratic societies, who value policy coherence and evidence-based programming, and who seek a clear national purpose in policy

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1 I would like to thank Iain Reeve for excellent research assistance, and Leslie Seidle and Christian Joppke for helpful comments on an earlier draft.
regimes. For such people, Canadian immigration policy is currently in chaos and deeply in need of a national framework which is guided by evidence and developed through vigorous public debate.

This paper traces the evolution of Canadian federalism across the full range of immigration and immigrant integration, and provides a preliminary assessment of the consequences. The next section sets the background, introducing the key features of the federal institutions in Canada and the basic nature of immigration and immigrant integration in the country. The third section traces the evolution of federal-provincial relations across the key phases of the immigration system in Canada, while the fourth section explores some of the impacts. The concluding section pulls the threads of the discussion together, and reflects on the implications of the Canadian pattern for conceptions of multi-level governance in the 21st century.

**Background**

*Federal society / federal institutions*

More than in many countries, Canadian politics are territorial politics, rooted in linguistic and regional divisions. To borrow Livingstone’s language, Canada is not only a federal state but also a federal society (Livingstone 1956). The division between English and French-speaking communities has been an elemental feature of politics in what is now Canada since the defeat of the French by the British in 1763, and the formation of the federation in 1867 was seen by many French-Canadian leaders as a compact between two peoples. Although there are small francophone communities in several provinces, the primary linguistic divide is now between Quebec and the rest of Canada. The French-speaking people of Quebec have come to see themselves as a distinct nation with its own history, culture and identity. A nationalist ethos pervades the entire political spectrum within the province, and a strong separatist movement has on occasion threatened the survival of a single Canadian state.

Wider conflicts among the regions of the country are also as old as the federation. Regional divisions take root in the geography of a country much larger than all of Europe. Although modern communication and transportation have diminished the salience of geography, they have not eliminated the political distance between the regions. This natural inheritance has been reinforced by economic and cultural development. Much of the history of the country can be written in terms of regionally uneven economic development and enduring tensions between the industrial heartland of central Canada and the resource-based economies of other regions. Social differences overlay economic ones, as different histories of settlement and immigration bestowed distinctive ethnic blends and cultures on the regions.
Territorial politics have been reflected and amplified by federal institutions. Legislative authority is divided between the federal government, ten provincial governments and three northern territories in complex ways, but both levels of government are engaged in most policy fields. The strength of regional interests and attitudes ensures that the Canadian federation is one of the most decentralized federations in the world (Watts 2008). In addition, the distinctive features of Quebec have led to significant asymmetries in the relations between the central government and the provinces, with Quebec carving out larger domains of autonomy within the federation. As a result, multilevel governance in Canada is marked by high levels of interdependence and the weakness of hierarchical mechanisms of control.

With the federal and provincial governments both engaged in many policy fields, much depends on the mechanisms through which they manage their interdependence. Canada was the first country to fuse federal institutions with the Westminster system of parliamentary government, which concentrates power in the hands of executives at both the federal and provincial levels. The prime minister and premiers, their cabinets and senior officials dominate the policy process in their respective governments. It is these executives who manage federal-provincial relations through elaborate diplomacy and federal-provincial agreements which can rival international treaties in their complexity.

There are few counterbalances to this executive dominance of intergovernmental relations. Unlike the German or U.S. systems, there is little space for the mediation of territorial disputes through legislatures. Members of the parliamentary caucus of the governing party play a role, but MPs from a province do not speak for their provincial government. Indeed, they may be political opponents. Moreover, the governing party is often weak in certain regions, depriving those parts of the country of champions around the cabinet table and in the party caucus. Furthermore, the upper chamber of Parliament, the Senate, remains an unelected body without the political legitimacy to serve as a forum for the resolution of regional or intergovernmental disputes. Nor does the party system integrate levels of government. Parties at the two levels are highly autonomous: federal and provincial parties bearing the same name are separate organizations, both in law and in political reality. Their leaders have separate career paths; their finances are unrelated; and their electoral bases are distinct. In several provinces, completely different parties operate in the federal and provincial arenas. Consequently, there are few, if any, vertical party mechanisms through which intergovernmental disputes are managed.

As a result, the primary vehicle for managing interdependence is intergovernmental negotiations, or what has been called intergovernmental diplomacy (Simeon 1972). Compared to some federations, these intergovernmental processes tend to be relatively informal and unstructured, with few formal venues, no firm decision rules, and no effective mechanisms for
resolving disputes and roadblocks. Nonetheless, the process is central to policy development in the country. Such a process tends to be particularly responsive to the interests of the governments at the table, and to social and economic issues that can be defined in regional terms. Such issues are readily championed by provincial governments. In contrast, more diffuse social interests have long complained of their relative exclusion.

Municipalities play a limited role in the Canadian federation. Legally, municipalities are creatures of the provincial government, which has untrammeled authority over them. In the field of immigration, major metropolitan centres, such as Toronto, Vancouver and Montreal, are home to the largest concentrations of immigrants in Canada. Yet they do not have political or financial authority over the core services related to successful immigrant integration. Despite these formal limits, cities are active in helping to coordinate agencies in the sector, supporting community organizations, developing avenues for immigrants and ethnic minorities to participate in community life, supporting anti-racism initiatives, and responding to local tensions (Good 2009; McIsaac 2003a and 2003b).

Canada has thus developed a distinctive version of multi-level governance, one shaped by a distinctive amalgam of territorial politics, parliamentary government and asymmetrical federal institutions. As we shall see below, this model applies with increasing force in the case of immigration and immigrant integration.

**Immigration and Integration**

Canada is one of the most multicultural countries in the world (Fearon 2003). Among OECD countries, it is virtually unique in the co-existence of three dimensions of difference: the historic divide between English- and French-speaking communities; the presence across the country of indigenous peoples, many of whom assert claims to self-governance; and significant immigrant communities. Canada is a classic settler society, with a long history of immigration; indeed, in historical perspective the most dramatic wave of immigration occurred in the years before World War I, when annual arrivals peaked at 5% of the population. But Canada still maintains one of the largest proportionate flows among OECD countries. Figure 1 tracks the trend in overall admissions from 1984-2008, capturing a sustained rise over the period. The annual flow of newcomers with permanent residency now represents 0.7% of the total population, and over time this flow has redefined Canadian society. First-generation immigrants – i.e., the foreign-born population – represented approximately 20% of the total population according to the 2006 Census. Moreover, in contrast to some host countries in which immigration comes predominantly from one part of the world, creating a relatively homogenous ‘other’, immigration to Canada has come from many different parts of the world, creating a ‘diverse diversity’ of ethnicities, races and religions. (See Table 1)
Canada has long seen immigration as an instrument of economic development and nation-building. Its immigration policy gives priority to economic migrants who are expected to enter the labour force quickly. Figure 1 also tracks the evolving balance among economic, family and refugee categories, demonstrating the growing dominance of the economic program. In addition, the country adds a large number of temporary residents. Figure 2 tracks the rise of the largest categories of temporary residents: foreign workers, foreign students and refugee claimants. Since 2008, skilled temporary workers and international students have a pathway to permanent resident status and eventual citizenship through the new Canadian Experience Class, introduced in 2008. For these groups, Canada has moved to a two-step immigration process.

In a country sensitized to regional politics, the regional distribution of immigration has been critical. During the last half century, newcomers have concentrated in three provinces: Ontario, British Columbia and Quebec. As Table 2 indicates, these three provinces received 90% of new permanent residents in 2000, with Ontario alone absorbing close to 60%. This hyper-concentration has been transforming the political geography of the federation, as other regions see their share of the total population and their economic and political weight in the country declining. As we shall see below, the result has been a pushback from other provinces, some of the effects of which can be seen in the distribution of newcomers in 2008.

Not surprisingly, the selection and integration of this large and diverse flow of newcomers is a constant preoccupation in Canada. This preoccupation has become more intense in recent years, as problems have emerged. Traditionally, immigrants to Canada moved quickly into the economic mainstream. However, recent cohorts of newcomers have not enjoyed the same economic success, despite having higher levels of education and training. They are starting at lower income levels and are taking much longer to converge on the income of the native-born population (Aydemir and Skuterud 2005; Frenette and Morissette 2005; Picot, Hou and Coulombe 2006; Picot and Sweetman 2005). Questions are also being asked about social integration, especially in the case of the second generation – the children of immigrants born in Canada. Until recently, the integration of the second generation was considered a Canadian

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2 The Canada Experience Class allows skilled temporary foreign workers with Canadian work experience and international students with Canadian degrees and Canadian work experience to apply for permanent residency based on their work experience and their knowledge of Canada’s official languages. They do not have to leave the country to apply and do not have to meet the requirements of the point system applicable to the normal economic category.
success story. Second-generation members of most racial minorities speak English or French with a flawless Canadian accent, match or surpass the educational achievements of their peers, and move effectively into the workforce. Success rates in schooling do vary across minorities, with Asian children doing particularly well but children with black, Latin American and Middle Eastern origins doing less well than the national average. Overall, however, the an OECD survey of the educational attainment of the children of immigrants found that little difference between the performance of immigrant and native students (OECD 2006; also Corak 2008). Nevertheless, recent studies have raised questions. Despite their impressive educational and economic successes, survey evidence suggest that the children of racial minority immigrants have a weaker sense of belonging and comfort in the country than their immigrant parents (Soroka, Johnston and Banting 2007; Reitz and Banerjee 2007).

Immigration and immigrant integration are constant issues in Canada, and the new challenges in integration process have triggered important shifts in the policy regime. And federalism is at the heart of the response.

**Federalism and the Integration Continuum**

The process of immigrant integration can be thought of as a continuum which begins with the selection/admission of immigrants and proceeds through their initial settlement and their eventual integration into the economic, social and political mainstream of the country. At each phase of this continuum, complex institutional systems come into play. The key components interlock but do not mesh perfectly. As Freeman comments, “No state possesses a truly coherent incorporation regime....Rather one finds sub-system frameworks that are weakly, if at all, co-ordinated” (Freeman, 2004: 946). In the Canadian case, coordination issues inherent in any democratic state are enhanced by federalism, which pervades the continuum.

The constitution itself provides only a partial definition of the division of power over immigration and immigrant integration. In the case of immigrant selection and admission, jurisdiction is concurrent. Section 95 of the Constitution Act 1867 bestows authority to make laws related to immigration on both the central government and the provinces, with the proviso of federal paramountcy: any provincial law related to immigration “shall have an effect in and for the Province as long as and as far as it is not repugnant to any Act of the Parliament of Canada.” At the other end of the continuum, Section 91(25) grants exclusive authority over naturalization to the federal government. The constitution is silent, however, about the intervening phases of the continuum. Immigrant integration was not a distinct concern of governments in the mid-19th century, when the constitution was drafted, and the term does not appear in the list of powers parceled out to the federal and provincial governments. The
general division of authority over relevant programs prevails as a result, and the longer term integration of immigrants depends most on provincial policies and programs, such as labour market policy, education, and social services.

These bare constitutional bones give only a partial view of intergovernmental relations in this sector. They have been supplemented with a complex array of political agreements that have been layered on top of each other through intergovernmental bargaining over the years. Although full meetings of federal-provincial-territorial ministers began again in 2002, after a hiatus of over a century, the critical bargaining tends to proceed on a bilateral basis between the central government and individual provinces. The result is considerable asymmetry, with Quebec having carved out a distinct role in the sector several decades ago and with variation creeping into the role of other provinces as well. Second, intergovernmental relationships have been changing rapidly in this sector, with significant decentralization in several phases of the process having occurred in the last few years. As a result, Canada has established the most decentralized immigration/integration regime of any federation – indeed any country -- in the OECD. Figure 3 provides an overview of the intergovernmental balance in each phase of the integration continuum, and the following sections set out the details.

Admission

Prior to the establishment of the Canadian federation in 1867, each of the separate colonies in British North America had been preoccupied with immigration. The decision to grant concurrent powers to both levels of the new federation was therefore understandable, and an intergovernmental conference on immigration the year following Confederation produced Canada’s first federal-provincial agreement. However, with the decline of immigration in the years after the First World War and especially during the 1930s, provincial interest waned. Provincial governments did lobby the federal government to limit immigration from some countries or of some types of people, but otherwise they largely withdrew from the field. As immigration revived in the postwar era, the federal government simply assumed a dominant role, as it did in many fields in the period. As Hawkins observed of this era, “… the management of immigration, in all its essential features, has been an exclusive federal concern”(Hawkins 1988: 179).

Federal predominance came under challenge beginning in the 1960s. Not surprisingly, the strongest challenge came from Quebec, where immigration has always held a particular sensitivity. Within the province, Quebecers of French-Canadian ancestry represent a strong majority; within the larger Canadian and North American contexts, however, they are a minority and are often concerned about the future of their language and culture. Historically, immigration was often seen as a threat to that culture, especially during the postwar era when immigrants tended to assimilate to the English-speaking community in the province. In those
years, analyses of public attitudes often concluded that Quebecers of French-Canadian descent were more opposed to immigration and less comfortable with ethnic and cultural pluralism than other Canadians (Berry, Kalin and Taylor 1976; Lambert and Curtis 1982, 1983). Opposition to immigration began to ease later in the century, as the birth rate in Quebec declined and the francophone share of the population of the country as a whole began to shrink (Gidengil et al 2004). Nonetheless, the sensitivity of the issues remained.

The Quebec government responded to these sensitivities vigorously. Beginning in 1972, the province adopted a series of increasingly powerful language and education laws to steer immigrants into the francophone community (McAndrew et al 2000). These policies were controversial when they were enacted, with Quebec nationalists and immigrant communities mobilizing massively on opposing sides. But the primacy of French as the language of the public realm has become a central pillar of the provincial policy regime. In addition, the provincial government sought to take greater control of immigration policy. Quebec established its own ministry of immigration in 1968 and negotiated a series of agreements on immigration with the federal government, beginning in 1971. The 1978 Cullen-Couture Agreement was particularly important in giving Quebec effective control over the selection of economic immigrants, and its terms were broadened and confirmed in a more comprehensive agreement in 1991. The province has established its own points system, which differed somewhat from the federal approach, especially in giving greater weight to French language skills. In principle, authority over policies concerning other categories of immigrants -- family class and refugees -- remained in federal hands, but the selection of refugees as immigrants is carried out jointly by the federal government and Quebec.\(^3\) As a result, Quebec became the first province to be directly involved in immigrant selection (Blad and Couton 2009; Garcea 1998; Grenier 2003; Kostov 2008).

Quebec exceptionalism did not persist. As is often the case in Canada, an initiative which Quebec sought as recognition of its distinctiveness triggered a broader decentralization. In the early stages, the momentum for decentralization came less from other provinces than from the federal government, which was uncomfortable with asymmetry and did not want Quebec to be the only province with an immigration agreement. In 1978, a new Immigration Act had enshrined provincial involvement as a principle of policy making, and committed the federal government to consultations with the provinces on overall immigrant levels as well as their own labour and demographic needs. It also gave the minister responsible for immigration the ability to enter into agreements with the provinces. Early immigration agreements were principally geared towards improving communication, information sharing, and ensuring lines of

\(^3\) An interesting example of asymmetry within asymmetry came in the aftermath of the Haitian earthquake when Quebec effectively widened the definition of family members after the federal government refused to so, enabling Haitians in Quebec to sponsor a wider range of family members than Haitians based in other provinces (Peritz 2010).
consultation (Vineberg forthcoming: 38-39). After the signing of the 1991 Accord with Quebec, however, the federal government was interested in signing more substantial agreements with other provinces.

By then, wider provincial concern was growing. The overwhelming concentration of immigrants in Ontario, British Columbia and Quebec prompted other regions to demand their ‘fair share’. Because of the mobility provision of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the prevailing view is the federal government cannot require new immigrants to settle in specific parts of the country (Kostov 2008: 91). But a provincial role in selection might have stronger steering effects. The Liberal government of the day wished to avoid replicating the Canada-Quebec approach, which would have eliminated the federal role in selection of economic migrants, and it responded tentatively in 1995 by introducing the Provincial Nominee Program (PNP). Under this program, provinces were authorized to identify a limited number of economic migrants to meet specific regional economic needs. Technically, the federal government issues the final acceptance, but the intergovernmental agreements commit the federal government to admit all provincial nominees, subject only to health and security considerations. Manitoba was the first to take up the offer, signing a framework agreement in 1998. By 2007, all other provinces but Quebec, as well as two of the northern territories, had signed on.

The initial intention was that the PNP would be small, with only 477 admissions in the first year. However, provincial enthusiasm for the program grew. In 2003, the federal Liberal government lifted the cap on the number of provincial nominations for Manitoba and, in the words of a senior Manitoba official, the program expanded “well beyond our wildest expectations” (Clément 2003: 199). In 2006, the Conservative Party came to power at the federal level, and in 2008 the minister removed the cap on provincial nominations for the country as a whole. In part this was a reflection of the Conservatives more decentralist orientation to federalism. More importantly, however, expanding the PNP system was a means of circumventing an immense backlog of 640,000 files which had emerged in the federal program for economic immigration, the Federal Skilled Workers Program, and which was generating long delays in obtaining clearance even for badly needed workers. The number of provincial nominations soared. With a cap on the total level of admissions but no cap on the PNP program, PNP admissions grow at the expense of the federal program. In 2009, the Auditor General pointed out that the PNP could quickly squeeze out the federal economic program almost completely (Auditor General 2009, chapter 2: 12). In introducing its immigration plan for 2011, the federal government announced that, one again, “the admission range for federal economic immigration has been reduced to permit further growth in the Provincial Nominee Program”

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4 Manitoba had been demanding its “fair share” of immigrants since 1969 (Hawkins 1988: 180).
5 Provincial governments cannot restrict the mobility rights either, and the ability to retain immigrants depends of developing a good match between immigrants selection and local needs.
(Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2010: 8). However, the federal government seems to be planning to reintroduce a cap on provincial nominations, stabilizing the program at a level which, in combination with the Quebec economic class, will equal the size of the federal program. Table 3 sets out the targets for the various streams of economic immigrants in 2011.

Provinces are free to develop their own selection criteria in their PNPs. The federal government does not specify any minimum selection threshold, and provinces are not bound by the federal points system or language provisions. Their programs have become highly diverse and complex over time, with selection criteria that vary substantially from one province to the other (ibid: 25). One important advantage is that processing times are dramatically shorter than for the federal program. For example, the processing time for a skilled worker applying through the federal economic program from Beijing is 57 months. The same worker, if approved by a province, would wait about 10 months (Carter et al 2010: fn 3).

Other changes are also enhancing the provincial role as gatekeepers for immigrants. Under the new Canadian Experience Class, international students who have completed degrees in accredited Canadian universities and worked for one year in the country can be fast-tracked for citizenship. This creates the possibility that some potential immigrants will apply to post-secondary institutions and complete degrees to gain an immigration short cut (Alboim 2009). But it also creates an opportunity for provinces, which are responsible for postsecondary education, to expand or contract this flow. In September 2010, ministers from the government of Ontario walked across the street to the University of Toronto to announce that the province was extending eligibility for its PNP program to include master as well as doctoral students, a step designed to ensure Ontario remains competitive in the hunt for knowledge workers (Rankin 2010).

In summary, the process of admission has undergone a major decentralization. The federal government remains engaged, and still controls important levers over immigration, including the overall levels of admissions and basic security rules. It also maintains a significant steering capacity, and could effectively ask the provinces for more policy uniformity and reporting in the deployment of their respective PNPs. So far, it has not done so, and provinces also remain significant, autonomous players in the admission process.

Socio-economic Integration

The story is much the same in the realm of socio-economic integration. However, the relationships here need to be considered in two dimensions: settlement programs provided to newcomers in their first years in the country; and programs relevant to longer term integration. The intergovernmental relations in the two dimensions differ considerably.
Settlement: Evidence suggests that settlement services are important to the long-term integration of newcomers, and Canada has developed a comprehensive set of programs, with a particular focus on the first three years after arrival. In contrast to many immigrant-receiving nations, Canada provides the majority of these services through third parties, including immigrant service provider organizations (SPOs), multicultural/ethnic organizations, educational institutions, or partners in the private sector (Biles 2008: 141). The federal government remains the largest funder of such programming, and its priority initiatives include:

- Immigrant Settlement and Adaptation Program (ISAP) funds basic information, interpretation and translation services, as well as referral to community services, solution-focused counseling, and basic employment-based services.
- Language Instruction for Newcomers (LINC) provides basic instruction for adults in one of the two official languages, with courses made available full-time or part-time in schools, community centres, workplaces, etc.
- Enhanced Language Training (ELT): enhanced language training aimed at specializing in particular labour fields.
- Host: an initiative which matches immigrants with Canadian volunteers who act as hosts, helping them learn about Canada and their community.

In addition to these major programs, the federal government has supported a number of smaller initiatives.  

Settlement programs have traditionally been available to permanent residents, not temporary residents, a limitation that has become more problematic as the number of temporary residents has increased, and as skilled temporary residents have been offered a pathway to permanency and eventual citizenship. These newcomers and their families are not eligible for language training or other supports.

The intergovernmental trajectory in settlement programs parallels that in admissions. Once again, Quebec led. During the 1980s, authority over immigration and integration was swept up into the intense federal-provincial struggles over constitutional reform designed to recognize and accommodate Quebec’s distinctiveness within the federation. These struggles consumed much of the political energy of an entire political generation. In 1987, a federal-provincial agreement known as the Meech Lake Accord included a proposal to constitutionalize the earlier agreement on Quebec’s role in immigrant selection and to transfer responsibility for all settlement services to the province. When the Meech Lake Accord failed to be ratified in 1989, the federal government moved ahead separately on the immigration file, concluding the

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6 In addition, the Canadian Orientation Abroad Program served 15,000 people in 22 countries in 2008 (CIC Report to Parliament 2008).
Canada-Quebec Immigration Agreement of 1991. As part of the agreement, the federal government withdrew from all settlement services in the province and transferred $75 million annually for settlement services, an amount that had grown to $253.7 million by 2010-11 (Seidle 2010: Table 1).

Devolution to other provinces soon followed. The precipitating factors were fiscal crisis and budgetary restraint. The federal government was faced with severe fiscal pressures in the mid-1990s, and became increasingly annoyed that the provinces were not helping to finance settlement programs. It therefore sought to off-load responsibility for settlement programming onto them. Some provinces were open to the idea, but not on the financial terms initially on offer. The federal government had to up the ante, ironically by virtually the full amount it had hoped to save through devolution (Vineberg forthcoming). In 1998, Manitoba and British Columbia agreed to accept comprehensive responsibility for settlement services, although their deals with the federal government differed from the Quebec agreement. During the 2000s, the federal government began to have second thoughts about extending full devolution to other provinces, and signed more limited deals with Alberta and Ontario. As a result, the field of settlement services is currently characterized by considerable asymmetry, with five types of intergovernmental relationships (Seidle 2010):

- Comprehensive provincial control (Quebec).
- Devolved model (British Columbia and Manitoba): province accepts responsibility for delivery of services.
- Co-Management model (Alberta): federal and provincial officials jointly select projects to be funded, and decide which will be funded by each level of government.
- Tri-Level Model (Ontario): a joint federal-provincial steering committee, with a formal role for the City of Toronto.
- Consultation model (other provinces): consultation and information sharing with the federal government, which still administers settlement services through its regional offices in conjunction with local non-profit organizations.

*Longer-term integration*: The process of long term integration into the mainstream can take many years, and the process is influenced by the general public services that were not designed specifically with immigrants in mind. As we have seen, a key problem in recent years has been the slowing economic incorporation of highly educated newcomers. In this context, credential recognition, supplementary training programs, and income support are important to newcomers. All of these fall primarily in provincial hands.

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7 In its 2010 budget, Ontario announced that it wished to pursue full devolution on the model of Manitoba and British Columbia.
For skilled immigrants trained in regulated professions, the recognition of their credentials by occupational regulatory bodies is critical. These bodies are accountable to provincial governments, and their assessment, recognition and licensing practices, including their use of standards and accountability frameworks, vary from province to province. The federal government has established a Foreign Credential Recognition Program but, given the limits of its jurisdiction, it cannot actually conduct credential assessment. Its role is indirect and advisory to regulatory bodies and employers, developing tools for assessing and recognizing the credentials of foreign trained individuals (Alboim and McIsaac 2007).

Training programs, which can be important to even skilled immigrants, also now fall under provincial jurisdiction. The federal government provides financial support for provincial programs through federal-provincial Labour Market Development Agreements (LMDAs), a decentralizing initiative launched in the aftermath of the Quebec referendum in 1995. However, eligibility for LMDA-supported training is limited to individuals who are eligible for the federal unemployment insurance benefits -- known as Employment Insurance -- and therefore excludes immigrants who are new market entrants. In 2007, the federal government announced a separate transfer to provinces to support labour market programs for people who are not eligible for training under the unemployment insurance program, which should help reduce the difficulties.

If immigrants become unemployed and need income support, their primary source of support is provincial social assistance. The federal Employment Insurance program has real limits; at the national level, approximately 40% of the unemployed actually receiving unemployment benefits. This pattern is accentuated for immigrants by the regional nature of the program. Coverage rates are dramatically lower in areas where the percentage of immigrants is higher. In Toronto, where almost one in two residents is an immigrant, only 22.3 per cent of unemployed people were receiving unemployment benefit in 2004 (Battle et al., 2006). In effect, the federal government has largely opted out of income stabilization in half of the country where most immigrants live. When times get tough in these regions, immigrants must increasingly turn to provincial social assistance programs.

Finally, for young immigrants and for the children of immigrants born in Canada – the second generation -- the educational system is the primary instrument of integration. Education is the most sacred of provincial jurisdictions, and the federal government has virtually no role at the primary and secondary levels. At the postsecondary level, the federal government is a partner in the student loan program and support of research. But it is provincial decisions that shape the overall scope and quality of the system. Education of the second generation is one success story that has not dimmed. As we saw earlier, Canada has a strong comparative advantage in educating immigrant and minority students.
The cumulative trend is clear: the socio-economic phases of the continuum have also witnessed substantial decentralization in recent years.

*Political integration: rights, identity and naturalization*

In contrast with immigrant admission and socio-economic integration, the process of political integration is dominated by the federal government. The three key federal instruments of identity formation and political integration are multiculturalism policy, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and naturalization.

The multiculturalism approach to immigrant integration was initially a federal initiative, introduced in a statement by the prime minister in 1971 and codified by a subsequent federal government in the Canadian Multiculturalism Act (1988). The formal program of multicultural grants is relatively small, but the approach permeates a wider range of federal departments and agencies. Moreover, while the Multiculturalism Act only covers the federal government, versions of the policy have been adopted by provincial and municipal governments, and even by businesses and civil society organizations (Garcea 2006).

The Canadian version of multiculturalism has sought to recognize and accommodate cultural differences, and to encourage active participation in the Canadian mainstream. The core goals of federal multiculturalism, as laid out in 1971 were: recognition and accommodation of cultural diversity; removing barriers to participation; promoting interchange between groups; and promoting acquisition of the official languages. The Canadian approach has thus been integrationist: it has sought to shift the terms on which integration proceeds, but the ultimate goal has been integration into the wider society (Kymlicka, 1998; Ley, 2010; Driedger 1978). Changes in the federal program over the years have reinforced the integrative intent. Starting in the late-1970s, the goals of participation and interethnic exchange increasingly received the lion’s share of funding under the federal program.

More importantly, the multiculturalism policies have helped nurture a more inclusive sense of national identity, one more capable of accommodating the diverse diversity of contemporary Canada. The adoption of the policies of bilingualism and multiculturalism in the 1960s and 1970s represented a state-led redefinition of national identity, an effort to de-centre the historic conception of the country as a British society and to build an identity more reflective of Canada’s cultural complexity. The adoption of a new flag, one without ethnic references, was a symbol of this wider transition (Champion, 2010; Igurtua, 2006; Uberoi, 2008). In addition to promoting a conception of Canada open to newcomers, multicultural norms have sought to shape the identity of the historic population. As Harell (2009) observes, multicultural norms
have helped to “normalize” diversity, especially for younger generations. Over the decades, Canadians have developed a multicultural conception of their identity, a definition of the country as a diverse community. In many countries, individuals with strongest sense of national identity are most opposed to immigration (Citrin et al., 2001; Martinez-Herrera, 2004; Shayo, 2009). In Canada, those with the strongest sense of Canadian identity embrace immigration and immigrants more warmly than their less nationalist neighbours (Johnston et al 2010).

The second federal instrument of political integration is the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which was entrenched in the constitution in 1982. Social integration of minorities requires a commitment to social justice and protection against discrimination at the hands of the majority population. Section 2 of the Charter establishes a set of fundamental freedoms, including a guarantee of freedom of religion which has been important in protecting members of minority religions in a number of critical cases. In addition, Section 15 forbids “discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex or mental or physical disability.” In interpreting this section, the Supreme Court has taken a broad view of equality, paying attention to systemic discrimination and the dangers of social exclusion when confronted with cases of discrimination. The reach of Charter jurisprudence extends through a larger human rights machinery, including federal and provincial human rights commissions, all of which operates within its boundaries. More broadly, the Charter has plays a role in political integration. It has contributed to a new rights-conscious culture, in which Canadians increasingly see themselves as a community of people holding the same rights and freedoms, irrespective of where they live, the language they speak – or where they were borne. In the immigration field, the Charter is also an instrument for “Canadianizing” newcomers, inviting them to see the federal government as a source of their protection from discrimination and to identify with the pan-Canadian political community (Gagnon 2009: 46-47).

The Charter both reinforces and limits the multicultural approach to integration. Section 27 of the Charter states that it will be “interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians”. But the commitment to individual rights embedded in the Charter also stands as a counter-weight to the multicultural strategy. The liberal democratic principles enshrined in the Charter represent a legal frame which circumscribes the range of cultural traditions deemed legitimate, ensuring that accommodation of difference does not slide into a justification for discrimination or the denial of basic equalities, such as the equality of women. As Eliadas observes, “when multiculturalism is unhinged from equality, it tends to careen off in unpleasant and increasingly unacceptable directions”(Eliadas, 2007: 551; also Smith 2009). The influence of the culture of rights spreads well beyond the court house, permeating public debates and controversies. Whenever a claim advanced in the name of multiculturalism is framed as being in conflict with individual or
equality rights, the Charter values tend to trump, as was illustrated by the controversy over a proposal for a Sharia court in Ontario which would adjudicate family and inheritance issues (Boyd 2007).

The final tool in the federal arsenal is naturalization. As we have seen, the federal government has exclusive authority over the granting of citizenship. It has chosen a welcoming approach, with immigrants becoming eligible for naturalization after three years in the country. They must take a citizenship test, which examines their understanding of Canadian democracy, history and geography. Unlike some countries, there is no separate language examination, but the citizenship test determines whether applicants have a basic ability to communicate in either English or French. The pass rate on the test is high, and the rate of naturalization of newcomers is among the highest in the world. According to a 2005 study, 84 percent of eligible immigrants were Canadian citizens in 2001; in contrast, the rate was 56 percent in the United Kingdom, 40 percent in the United States, and lower still in many European states (Tran, Kustec and Chui 2005). Table 4 tracks naturalization numbers in recent years.

The federal approach to political integration has not gone uncontested. Each instrument of federal action – multiculturalism, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and naturalization – has proven controversial in Quebec. The provincial government has developed its own approach to diversity, known as interculturalism, which encourages newcomers to develop a sense of belonging to the Quebec political community (Gagnon and Iacovino 2007; Labelle and Rocher 2004). While federal language legislation and the Charter promote the choice of two official languages, English and French, the Quebec model defines French as the language of public life in the province. At important stages, the provincial language laws also came into conflict with the federal language regime, including the language provisions of the federal Charter of Rights.

Immigrants to Quebec are thus swept up into two nation-building projects, two conceptions of the community they are encouraged to join. The Quebec government encourages minorities to join its national project of building a distinct society in Quebec. The federal government emphasizes attachment to the pan-Canadian community, and the granting of citizenship is a symbolic affirmation of its vision of Canada. The study guide which the federal government gives to immigrants preparing for the citizenship test, the formal ceremonies at which citizenship is formally awarded, and the oath of loyalty which newcomers take are all celebrations of Canada, replete with Canadian flags and symbols. – prompting nationalist suggestions that the Quebec government give an official status to Quebec citizenship (Gagnon 2009: 45). In effect, “two identity-making processes that are in conflict with each other are operating simultaneously towards ends that are at odds with each other” (Labelle and Rocher
2004: 275; also Labelle and Rocher 2009; Gagnon 2009. Gagnon and Iacovino 2007: 122). These dynamics have no parallel in other provinces.

The imprint of federalism thus pervades the immigration continuum. A powerful decentralizing process has transformed the admission and integration of immigrants to Canada. Only the final stage of the continuum, political integration, is dominated by the federal government, and even there federal predominance is challenged. In the space of two decades, Canada has moved into a complex, decentralized asymmetrical world.

**Impacts**

Does any of this matter? Are the patterns of immigration policy and integration programs different than they would be in a more centralized institutional setting? And do the differences in policies across the country lead to differences in the level of integration of immigrants? This section explores these questions, examining the implications of institutional change for responsiveness, equity, coherence, the larger federal balance, and immigrant integration. The questions cannot be resolved definitively, but intergovernmental relations do seem to leave their imprint in a number of dimensions. Judgments have to be provisional, since the speed of program change is vastly outstripping our capacity for evaluation. We lack serious evaluations of virtually every aspect of this rapidly evolving sector. But initial straws in the wind help frame the emerging debate.

*Responsiveness to regional diversity*

The promise of decentralization is greater policy responsiveness to local conditions. Regional authorities are often said to understand local needs more clearly, to engage with communities more fully, and to respond to them more quickly. Is the promise realized in practice?

In the case of admissions, decentralization has clearly allowed some provinces to tailor policy to local conditions. Most obviously, the Canada-Quebec accord has allowed Quebec to introduce a distinctive version of the points system, which gives greater to applicants who speak French. The federal government, which is committed in its overall language policies to treating French and English equally, would have greater difficulty doing this. Similarly, the PNP initiative has allowed Manitoba to change the skill mix of new arrivals in that province. The federal points system favoured highly educated knowledge-workers, and rejected the semi-skilled occupations in demand in Manitoba. In contrast, the provincial program is driven primarily by employers; an offer of employment is the primary criterion for admission, and the occupational focus has shifted towards semi-skilled trades. In the early years the priority was to garment workers. There have been other advantages for Manitoba as well. The province has been
relatively successful in dispersing immigrants in smaller communities outside of the Winnipeg metropolitan area. In addition, the retention rate for immigrants has been much higher for provincial nominees, remaining above 70% five years after obtaining permanent status. In comparison, the retention rate for federal economic immigrants who came to Manitoba in the same period dropped to only 60% after one year and continued to decline thereafter (Carter et al. 2010). The Manitoba PNP helps explain the increase in the proportion of immigrants in the prairie provinces revealed in Table 2.

The Manitoba program is widely seen as a success. But this pattern has not been universal. Other small provinces which traditionally receive few immigrants, such as those in Atlantic Canada, have not be as active or have managed their programs as effectively. At the extreme, important elements of the program in Prince Edward Island were suspended amid controversies about conflicts of interest and financial improprieties, and vigorous demands in the provincial legislature for an independent inquiry (CBC 2009).

The decentralization of settlement programs has not been studied as carefully. The federal administration of settlement programs has often been criticized its inability to adapt national policies to diverse localities; and the non-profit organizations delivering settlement services in Manitoba reported an improvement when the provincial government assumed responsibility for services (Leo and August 2009). However, there is nothing inevitable about this outcome. A parallel study of British Columbia found a starkly different experience, in which community organizations were systematically shut out of the policy process and part of the initial federal financial transfer for settlement services was re-directed elsewhere in the provincial budget. The extent of engagement and consultation with local communities, service providers and municipalities clearly depends less on the level of jurisdiction than on the ideological orientation of the government involved. In the words of the analyst who studied both provinces: “in multi-level governance there are no straight lines, and no one dimensional solutions” (Leo and Enns 2009: 95).

Equity

Does federalism help or hurt immigrants? For applicants to Canada, the diversity of admission systems will inevitably reduce equity and fairness, as applicants with the same attributes are likely to receive different treatment depending on the door on which they knock (Alboin 2009). But does federalism benefit or hurt immigrants after they arrive? In some societies, federal institutions have left minorities vulnerable to discrimination at the hands of local majorities. The classic case is the United States, where federal intervention was required to dismantle the Jim Crowe system of discrimination against black Americans in the south. In the current Canadian context, this is less of a risk. Canadian history records many cases of racial discrimination at both levels of government. But the Charter of Rights now provides stronger
protection from majorities at both the national and provincial levels. In this context, minorities probably have reasons to value the checks and balances of a federal state. Moreover, as we have seen, the multination nature of Canada has contributed to a more multicultural, less assimilationist orientation to integration.

Equity can also be considered through a state-centred lens. Decentralization in the immigration sector was driven in part by a concern for “fairness” in the treatment of different regions of the country. As we have seen, the current immigration system is generating a “fairer” distribution of immigrants across the country as a whole. There have been tensions along the way, of course. For example, the movement to asymmetry generated intense provincial acrimony over the allocation of federal funding for settlement programs. The funding component of the 1991 Canada-Quebec agreement was very generous, with the result that Quebec was receiving vastly more funding per immigrant than provinces carrying proportionately much larger burdens such as Ontario and British Columbia. In the end, Ontario only agreed to establish a PNP, which Ottawa wanted, if it received a “fairer” distribution of financial support. Sorting out that mess required a significant additional injection of new federal funds into settlement programming. (See Seidle 2010: table 1)

Policy coherence and accountability

While there seem to be gains in terms of responsiveness and equity, decentralization and asymmetry have produced what is arguably the world’s most complicated immigration system. The lack of meta-rules or a common policy framework for economic immigration has generated diverse pathways to Canada. In the words of one commentator, “potential immigrants to Canada are confronted with the Quebec immigration program, nine provincial nominee programs, and two territorial programs, each with their own sub-component, selection criteria, fees, application processes, and timelines” (Alboim, 2009: 34-35). The Auditor General of Canada has also underscored the emergence of “more than 50 different categories, each with its own selection approach and criteria” (Auditor General 2009: chapter 2, p.25). Even this may underestimate the complexity. A federal official has indicated to one researcher that there are now some 160 different “immigration program streams” into Canada (Seidle 2010: fn. 19).

Policy incoherence is inevitable. For example, fragmentation creates openings for venue-shopping by prospective immigrants, with the aid of a thriving industry of immigration consultants. People refused permission by the federal department are sometimes advised they might be successful applying to a province instead (Kent 2010: 4). Such problems emerged in the early days of the Manitoba PNP. In 2002, the federal government stiffened its own entry requirements. As a result, “Manitoba was flooded with applicants seeking a back door into the country”, (Leo and August 2009: 501-02). Moreover, given the right of inter-provincial mobility once in the country, some provinces may act as a backdoor into others.
It is hard to believe the new regime has increased accountability to citizens, except perhaps in Quebec. In the rest of the country, Canadians can be forgiven for being confused. Who is responsible for monitoring and evaluating the immigration system? Who is charge of fixing problems? At the moment, the answer to both questions is everyone and no-one. The Auditor General is clearly uncomfortable with the variable geometry of the current system and the lack of consolidated information. In a revealing aside, the 2009 report noted that even that although PNP agreements require the provinces to collect information of the retention of nominees in their jurisdiction, “the information is either absent or incomplete and not always shared with the (federal) Department” (Auditor General 2009: chapter 2, p. 26). Her report recommended that the Provincial Nominee Programs be formally evaluated (Auditor General 2009: 26-27), and the federal government committed itself to such a review in 2010-2011. But how comprehensive can a purely federal review actually be? Will comprehensive data be forthcoming? And who should respond to any report that emerges? None of the answers to these questions is simple.

*The Federal Balance: nation-building/province-building*

Much of the history of Canadian federalism the last half century can be written in terms of ongoing struggles between nation-building and province-building processes. In various periods, both levels of government have sought to strengthen their relationships with citizens and civil society. This dynamic is best illustrated in the field of social policy. For the central government, social policy has been seen as an instrument of territorial integration, part of the social glue holding together a vast country subject to powerful centrifugal tendencies. National social programmes create a network of relations between citizens and central government throughout the country, helping to define the boundaries of the national political community and enhancing the legitimacy of the federal state. However, provincial governments, especially the Quebec government, have also seen social policy as an instrument for building a distinctive community at the regional level, one reflecting the linguistic and cultural dynamics of québécois society. For both levels of government, therefore, social policy has been an instrument not only of social justice but also of statecraft, to be deployed in the competitive processes of nation-building (Banting, 2005).

A similar dynamic is at work in immigration policy. Which level of government admits new immigrants is undoubtedly important to their long-term conception of the political community they are joining. Which level of government engages with civil society organizations to deliver settlement services matters to the pattern of linkages between state and society. As immigrant admission are decentralized, the federal government fades a little more from the lives of future citizens; as settlement programs are decentralized, hundreds of lines of contact between the central government and civil society are cut. For example, in 2008, the federal government had
contribution agreements with over 300 local civil society organizations which deliver local settlement services (Biles 2008: 166). But such links are severed in provinces with full devolution agreements. In those regions, the federal government becomes more distant, less engaged in the economic and social realities of the country, less likely to be understood and trusted by local communities.

The current trajectory has triggered laments from more nationally oriented critics about the lack of a national vision in immigration policy. Tom Kent, a former senior federal official, complains that: “the national purpose for immigration is lost” (Kent 2010: 1). Naomi Alboim, a former senior provincial official concurs: “Provinces, employers, universities and colleges do not have the national interest as their mandate or objective....(They are not) in the business of selecting individuals on their long-term potential to contribute to Canada as citizens” (Alboim 2009: 50-51).

*Levels of Integration*

Does any of this matter to the actual integration of newcomers to Canada? Are there significant regional variations in the economic, social and political integration of newcomers? If so, are can such regional differences be attributed to the federal nature of the policy regime? This final question is the most challenging. Untangling the influence of differences in provincial programs from all of the other factors that influence integration is an analytically difficult task. Nevertheless, the question is important since, as we saw at the outset, Canada is having greater difficulty integrating its newcomers.

Differences in integration levels across the English-speaking regions of the country seem limited, and there is no evidence as yet that decentralization has led to strikingly different levels of success. In the case of Manitoba, for example, the experience of provincial nominees and federal economic migrants entering the province in the same period are interesting. Provincial nominees had an initial economic advantage. Although they were much less likely to hold university degrees, their earnings were very similar to the earnings of the more highly educated federal class immigrants in their year of arrival. But in the years after landing, immigrants with university degrees saw more rapid earnings growth, offsetting the initial advantage of the PNP group (Carter et al 2010). The social and political integration of immigrants also proceeds in similar ways across the English-speaking regions. Bilodeau et al (2010) compare the attitudes of immigrants and the native-born on questions which normally produce sharp differences across the regions of the country, such as whether people trust the federal government or believe that their province is treated fairly in the federation. Their findings suggest that immigrants tend to embrace the views prevailing in the province where they settled.
This lack of obvious differences across the rest of the country should not be surprising. In part, the decentralizing trend is too recent to have left much of a mark on integration patterns. But more importantly, the dominant factors that shape the inclusion of newcomers into Canadian life are undoubtedly to be found in the day-to-day lived experience of newcomers as they confront their new surroundings. In comparison, public policies are likely to leave a more limited imprint.

Patterns within Quebec are different from the rest of the country. While economic integration has weakened in all parts of the country, it has weakened more in Quebec (Boudarbat and Boulet 2007; Chicha and Charest 2008; Nadeau and Secklin 2101). Table 5 provides one indicator of the differences: the unemployment rates of immigrants in Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver. In attempting to explain the difference, analysts have focused on the importance that Quebec immigration policy gives to the ability to speak French. The global pool of potential immigrants who speak French is smaller than the pool who speak English, and Quebec attracts more immigrants from countries with less well developed educational systems. Immigrants to Quebec tend to have lower and probably less transferable skills than in the rest of the country. In effect, “in choosing its immigrants, Quebec must compromise between immigrants’ linguistic skills and the other skills that they bring with them” (Nadeau and Secklin 2010: 279). However, these differences seem inherent in the nature of Canadian dualism, and the larger linguistic politics of Canada, rather than the details of Quebec’s immigration policies. If immigrants heading for Quebec had been selected according to federal criteria, they would have fared even less well in the Quebec labour market (Nadeau and Secklin 2010: Figure 5).

Differences also appear in social and political integration of immigrants in Quebec. In contrast to the rest of the country, immigrants to Quebec are less likely to embrace the identities and loyalties of the native-born population in the province, expressing greater support for the federal government than do their native-born neighbours (Bilodeau et al 2010). Slightly different results emerge from a study of the second generation of visible minority groups in Quebec and the rest of Canada (Banting and Soroka n.d). The drop in the sense of “belonging” is more marked in Quebec than in the rest of the country; but the drop occurs for both belonging in Canada and belonging in the province. These results suggest that the distinctive identity politics in the province do not lead immigrants to identify with Ottawa as their protector; rather they remain more distant from both political communities and their ancient battles (also Anctil 1984). As in the case of economic integration, however, it seems difficult to attribute these patterns of inclusion to the minor differences in settlement programming that exists between Quebec and the rest of the country. Rather they reflect the distinctive nature of identity politics in the province.
Conclusions

In the space of two decades, Canada has moved from a centralized immigration regime to a decentralized, asymmetrical world. Provincial governments are now powerful actors in the admission and integration stages of the immigration continuum. Only the final stage of the continuum, political integration, is still dominated by the federal government. The result is probably the most complex immigration system in the world, and a set of intergovernmental relations characterized by asymmetry rather than a common conception of federalism.

This complicated transition has been driven by complicated forces. The initial catalyst was substate nationalism, as Quebec sought to carve out greater autonomy within the federation. But the wider asymmetry reflects the shifting cross-currents at the federal level and among the other provinces. The federal government has been strikingly ambivalent throughout this period: uncomfortable with the starkly visible asymmetry generated by accommodating Quebec’s distinctiveness; intent on encouraging a wider devolution to reduce that visibility; but unwilling to give other provinces the full powers transferred to Quebec. The federal government has balanced these conflicting impulses differently over the years, reflecting changes in the fiscal strength of its treasury, the ideology of the government in power, and the severity of the problems plaguing its own immigration programs. The response of other provinces has also been varied, both across time and across the country, contributing further to asymmetrical outcomes. Some smaller provinces which traditionally received few immigrants and whose political weight in the country was fading, such as Manitoba, responded energetically. But others, especially in Atlantic Canada, did not. Moreover, the provinces with the largest immigrant populations and the most at stake responded cautiously. In an era of fiscal pressures, money mattered a lot. British Columbia, perched on the west coast and more autonomist in many dimensions, moved first. Ontario, with immense numbers of immigrants and a population more trusting of the federal government, is moving slowly. The result has been the slow accretion of bilateral deals and a variegated intergovernmental geometry.

This complicated model offers lessons for traditional debates over the strengths and weaknesses of multi-level governance. The scorecard is mixed. Decentralization has offered regional units the ability to tailor policies more responsive to local conditions and priorities. It has also spread immigrants across the country somewhat more evenly. Whether decentralization has increased equity for immigrants is more debatable. The variation between provinces in admissions and services means that immigrants in similar circumstances are treated differently. But in other ways, immigrants may have reason to value the checks and balances of federalism. Decentralization has also increased opportunities to include local communities in policy development across this vast landscape, although in practice the extent to which the provincial governments have used their greater autonomy to embrace civil society
has varied with the ideology of provincial governments in power. As we have seen, there are no straight lines to progress here.

There are also disadvantages. One cannot claim that decentralization has enhanced political accountability. Canada has moved from a world in which one government was clearly responsible for immigration to a world in which everyone and no-one is in charge and accountable. This critique applies less in Quebec, where power is more concentrated. But elsewhere, the system is opaque. There has also been a loss of policy coherence. The speed of change exceeds the comparatively weak evaluative systems which the country can muster, and no one understands the system as a whole. The opportunities for venue-shopping by applicants and the consultants who assist them are increased. Gaps emerge, such as the lack of settlement services, language training and social benefits for skilled temporary workers who governments hope will flock to permanency and citizenship. Adjustments are driven by short-term pressures, with little attention to long term consequences. Allocating blame for these problems is difficult even for experts in the field, let alone the average voter.

Finally, there is a loss of national vision. Canada has long seen immigration as an instrument of nation-building. A singular conception of the nation to be built is clearly inappropriate, given Canadian dualism. At a minimum, immigration is part of two nation-building projects, with tensions between them emerging most clearly in Quebec. But within the rest of Canada, it is now difficult to envision a national debate about immigration policy, let alone a national vision, since responsibilities and policies vary so much across the country.

The lack of public debate is striking. A few researchers and commentators have decried loss of policy coherence and national vision. While immigration policy seizes centre stage in countries around the world, public debate in Canada largely ignores the sweeping transitions taking place. In part this undoubtedly reflects the Canadian public’s unusually supportive attitudes towards immigration (Banting, forthcoming). In part, it reflects the low-visibility, stealth-like instruments used to change policy. Ministerial instructions and closed federal-provincial negotiations rather high-profile legislative changes have been the order of the day. But the lack of debate undoubtedly also reflects the diffuse nature of power over immigration policy.

As noted at the outset, the Canadian case provides the raw material for a lively debate between two views of governance in the 21st century. Enthusiasts for the Canadian experiment should include those who see multi-level governance as a means of reducing the role of the state in steering social change, those who place their faith in markets and in the uncoordinated actions of independent social agents, and those who believe in the responsiveness and self-correcting capacities of local communities. For such people, the evolving Canadian immigration system is an exciting experiment in social autonomy. In contrast, the contemporary pattern should trouble those who have faith in collective decision-making in democratic societies, who value
policy coherence and evidence-based programming, and who seek a clear national purpose in policy regimes. For such people, Canadian immigration policy is currently in chaos and deeply in need of a national framework which is guided by evidence and developed through vigorous public debate. Such a debate is clearly in order. At stake is who should choose future Canadian citizens and shape the type of country Canada will be in the decades to come. Hardly a trivial issue.
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Figure 1. Composition of Immigrant Inflow by Category of Immigrant, 1984-2008.

Koning and Banting 2010

Figure 2. Temporary Residents in Canada, principal categories, 1989-2008

Source: Koning and Banting 2010
Figure 3. Federalism and the Integration Continuum

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage</th>
<th>Federal</th>
<th>Provincial</th>
<th>Quebec</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Admission</td>
<td>Traditionally dominant</td>
<td>Growing rapidly</td>
<td>Substantial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Settlement</td>
<td>Asymmetric responsibility</td>
<td>Asymmetric responsibility</td>
<td>Exclusive responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-economic integration</td>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>Primary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political integration</td>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>Secondary</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Immigrant population, Canada, Quebec and metropolitan centres, 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>Province of Quebec</th>
<th>Montreal</th>
<th>Toronto</th>
<th>Vancouver</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% Immigrants</td>
<td>19.8%</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
<td>19.9%</td>
<td>42.7%</td>
<td>37.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Immigrants by place of origin*

- United States: 4.0%  3.1%  2.3%  1.8%  3.0%
- Central and South America: 6.2%  9.2%  8.8%  6.7%  2.8%
- Caribbean and Bermuda: 5.1%  9.5%  10.3%  7.5%  0.7%
- Europe: 36.8%  36.0%  34.4%  29.9%  21.9%
  - United Kingdom: 9.4%  1.9%  1.7%  5.4%  7.7%
  - Other Northern and Western Europe: 7.9%  10.9%  8.4%  2.9%  5.0%
  - Eastern Europe: 8.3%  8.5%  8.9%  8.4%  4.9%
  - Southern Europe: 11.3%  14.7%  15.4%  13.1%  4.4%
- Africa: 6.1%  14.6%  14.7%  5.1%  3.3%
- Asia and the Middle East: 40.8%  27.4%  29.3%  48.8%  65.4%
  - West Central Asia and the Middle East: 6.0%  9.5%  10.2%  6.4%  4.4%
  - Eastern Asia: 14.1%  6.2%  6.3%  15.4%  35.6%
  - Southeast Asia: 9.1%  6.6%  7.1%  9.3%  13.0%
  - Southern Asia: 11.6%  5.0%  5.7%  17.8%  12.3%
- Oceania and other countries: 1.0%  0.3%  0.3%  0.4%  2.9%

Source: 2006 Census, from tables reported on the Statistics Canada website (statcan.ca).
### Table 2. Distribution of New Permanent Residents, by region, 2000 and 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Atlantic provinces</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quebec</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>58.7</td>
<td>42.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prairie provinces</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>18.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Columbia</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Citizenship and Immigration Canada

### Table 3. Target Levels for Economic Immigration, 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Low (000s)</th>
<th>High (000s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Federal economic class</td>
<td>74.0</td>
<td>80.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial economic class</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Quebec economic class</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>35.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Provincial nominees</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>45.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total economic class</td>
<td>150.6</td>
<td>161.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: principal applicants pluses spouses and dependents
Source: Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2010, Table 1.*
Table 4. Naturalization, 2005-2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Citizenship</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Applications (000’s)</td>
<td>216.0</td>
<td>224.5</td>
<td>227.5</td>
<td>240.2</td>
<td>233.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Citizens (000's)</td>
<td>198.7</td>
<td>260.8</td>
<td>199.8</td>
<td>176.5</td>
<td>156.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceremonies</td>
<td>3,483</td>
<td>3,926</td>
<td>3,049</td>
<td>2,733</td>
<td>2,223</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Applications received 79,682 59,094 60,107 56,314 57,593
Approved 79,142 64,977 56,734 41,508 75,217
Refused 375 388 89 56 242
Closed for other Reasons 2,138 2,264 2,043 1,518 n/a
Total 81,655 67,629 58,866 43,082 n/a
Inventory 22,459 29,575 35,917 54,076 n/a

Table 5. Unemployment of immigrants and native born: Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver, 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Montreal</th>
<th>Toronto</th>
<th>Vancouver</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Born in Canada</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Population</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Chicha and Charest, 2008: Table 8