Devolution in England: International Perspectives, Politics and Policy Ideas after Brexit

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The Forum of Federations, the global network on federalism and multi-level governance, supports better governance through learning among practitioners and experts. Active on six continents, it runs programs in over 20 countries including established federations, as well as countries transitioning to devolved and decentralized governance options. The Forum publishes a range of information and educational materials. It is supported by the following partner countries: Australia, Brazil, Canada, Ethiopia, Germany, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan and Switzerland.
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The Centre for Federal Studies (University of Kent), the James Madison Charitable Trust, the Forum of Federations and the Federal Trust Fund co-organised a conference ‘Devolution in England: International Perspectives, Politics and Policy Ideas after Brexit,’ on the 20-21 June 2017 at the University of Kent. Around 40 participants, politicians, senior academics, policy makers and NGO representatives from the United Kingdom, Belgium, Germany, Switzerland, Canada, Spain and Italy, attended the conference. The conference aimed to shed the light on the on-going debate over devolution in the UK and more specifically the implication that Brexit will have on the future of institutional design within the UK. The conference was organised in seven sessions that looked on lessons from across the countries such as Germany, Belgium, Switzerland, Spain and Canada in order to provide policy ideas and recommendations.

Federal Devolution in Theory and Practice

Federations are not static; they are constantly being modified and adjusted to accommodate pressures, both from outside and from within. Not only do federations change over time, but also their institutional architectures vary across the countries. According to Paolo Dardanelli there is a need to think about these varieties of federalism and of what they entail even in the classical federal countries such as Canada, USA or Switzerland.

Canada represents a classical federation; it is the first Westminster style federation created in the recent history. It was created to accommodate diversity and prevent the type of conflict that occurred in the USA (the civil war). Canadian federation was founded on the principles of peace, order and good governance. In the past the federal government would disallow the provincial legislation if it was against these basic principles. However, as the trend of decentralisation has become more prevalent in Canada and provinces have acquired more powers and competencies, they have become less dependent on the federal level even in the financial terms. Although there are three levels of government in Canada (federal, provincial and municipal), autonomy of municipalities is not legally recognized. The constitution provides that provinces have exclusive control over municipali-
ties. They are, as Chattopadhyay argues, “creatures of provinces” and the level of their autonomy and powers depend almost entirely on how much provincial governments are willing to grant them. However, as Canada is highly urbanized state, metropolis have important role to play in the implementation of some federal and provincial policies such as for example immigration. Canada is a country of immigrants and it takes approximately 300 000 immigrants every year. Although immigration is the federal responsibility and in some cases joint shared responsibility between federal and provincial governments, urban areas/metropolis have important role to play as well, as integration of immigrants is a task of municipalities. According to Chattopadhyay provinces are becoming more open to include the third level of government in the process, allowing for example municipalities to get share of the gas tax.

Unlike Canada, Spain is not a federation in the classical sense nor does the Spanish constitution describe it as a federation. The constitution does not completely regulate the autonomy process leaving the possibility for the devolution of other regions through the “availability” or “voluntariness” principle. Therefore the Spanish federal system captures the idea of “the autonomy à la carte.” Exclusive powers reserved for the Spanish states among others include defence, foreign policy, social security, criminal law, external trade, telecommunications, immigration and coordination of economic policy. Exclusive powers of the autonomous communities are given in agriculture, industry, spatial and urban planning, culture, social services, tourism, etc. The central government and the autonomous communities have concurrent powers in health, education, environmental protection, local government organisation, the media etc. However, according to Colino, the constitutional distribution of powers and responsibilities in Spain is not a clear-cut. The central government reserves the right to intervene to guarantee “coordination of the general planning of economic activity” and “equality of all Spanish citizens.” Colino argues that these constitutional provisions allow for encroachment on exclusive regional powers by the Spanish state in for example agriculture, industry, trade etc. Spanish federal system is also characterised by asymmetries, which Colino divides into permanent and informal/temporal. Permanent asymmetries are the ones recognised and protected by the Spanish Constitution such as: recognition of co-official languages, which have direct implications on education, cultural policies and citizens rights in Catalonia, Galicia, Navarra, Valenica, Balearic Aragon and the Basque Country; recognition of traditional civil law systems in Catalonia, Galicia, Navarra, Valenica, Balearic Aragon and the Basque Country and recognition and protection of special economic-fiscal arrangements through constitutional recognition of historical rights of the Basque Country, Navarra and special economic-fiscal regime for the Canary Islands. Temporal or informal asymmetries are created by choice in the exercise of national and regional.
fiscal framework and public spending have elements of federalism as well. Almost half of the public expenditure are managed by the regional and local governments. Governments of autonomous provinces receive fixed percentage of tax revenues collected by the central government and have some autonomy to increase (shared) taxes e.g. personal income and create new taxes. There is also fiscal equalisation scheme through several funds with aim to decrease the gap between the funding needs of autonomous communities and their tax capacities.

The Spanish system of governance has several important implications. Firstly, governments of the autonomous communities have some capacity to implement innovative policy options and experiments, but cooperation and competition among them are limited. Secondly, duplication of tasks and overlapping of work leads to the problem of cost-effectiveness. Thirdly, the Spanish system shows important challenges of coordination between the central and regional level, but also at the horizontal level between the autonomous communities. The system has also led to regional disparities, which are most salient in health (disparities in resources across regions especially in public health and hospital care), education (territorial disparities among the autonomous communities in students performance, schooling, rates, curricula and teachers pay), social service and poverty (autonomous communities have different levels and eligibility criteria for the minimum income assistance schemes), environment (large policy and regulatory divergence across the autonomous communities) and housing and urban planning (large regulatory divergence across the autonomous communities).

What are the costs of the system and possible lessons for the United Kingdom? Colino concludes that in general, the Spanish case has proved that devolution can create the system that works, the system, which adapts to the public preferences in different regions, and which combines the elements of symmetry and asymmetry in practice with some relative success. The Spanish model has provided space for recognition and protection of diversity and for the basic equality of citizens, but that at the same time imposes certain limits to the degree of achievable asymmetry. However, the system only allows low participation of the autonomous communities in the central government decision-making and creates problems with the central government encroachment, which leads to tension between autonomy, cooperation and equality of all the Spanish citizens.
On the other hand, the German federal model, according to Klaus Detterbeck, could be seen as a role model of cooperative federalism and joint decision-making system. The German model implies high degree of shared rule and limited self-rule and diversity and requires an intense coordination between the central and regional governments in producing uniform policy outcomes. Uniformity and “coming together” has been achieved by giving the strong role to Bundesrat. The German federal system is a functional federalism based on “coming together” with a long tradition of shared rule going back to the Middle Ages. Political parties have important role to play in the German parliamentary system of governance; they are vertically integrated, mirroring federal and regional cooperation and represent the driving force of German federalism. Public opinion in Germany is in favour of the uniformity that the federal system creates and is against the differences in e.g. education or health care. The system leads to relative lack of regional distinctiveness with no significant nationalist, ethnic, linguistic or religious cleavages on territorial basis. The 2006 reform of the German federal model provided (limited) disentanglement of competencies between two levels and reduced the veto potential of Bundesrat, creating space for regional policy variation. The latest reform (2017) envisages new scheme of fiscal federalism abandoning horizontal fiscal redistribution. The fiscal equalisation will be provided by the central level, which means that less wealthy regions will depend on the federal level for financial resources thus leading to asymmetry and limiting their autonomy. In the recent years, Germany has developed increasingly towards a centralized system, pooling most competences of policy making to the federal level to ensure uniformity. This means that Länders may have their own legislation over certain issues, but only if they are not already regulated by the central level. Taxes are by and large collected by the federal level and then shared across landers through vertical and horizontal redistribution. The German federal model has been easily adaptable to decision-making structures of the EU, and German Länders have managed to expand their model of “shared rule” to EU politics according to Detterbeck. One of the particularities is that Bundesrat has co-decision rights in EU politics since the early 1990s. As for the distribution of competencies, Länders have limited exclusive competencies in education, culture and police. They mainly have the competence to implement and administer policies. However, they can protect their interests as they are indispensable part of federal policy decision-making (although mainly at an aggregate level). For Detterbeck this system of the shared rule only works as long as Länders work together.

So, what are the lessons for devolving powers? According to Detterbeck the main question for other federations and federations in making is how much territorial variations they are willing to accept and how much territorial uniformity they want to achieve. Dual federalism with flexible cooperation according to
Detterbeck provides room for more territorial diversity. There should be no strong second chamber composed of regional governments with strong veto powers, distribution of competencies must have a robust constitutional basis and devolved regions must have sufficient fiscal means to exercise their powers and responsibilities. However, Detterbeck warns that such federal model may have more challenges to keep the union together and preventing the slippery slope. When looking at the federal experiences from Canada and Spain, Detterbeck concludes that it is evident that Canadians and Spaniards want very different things from the federal system than Germans do. Cooperative federalism in Germany has served two main aims: creating checks and balances that control political power of central executive and national solidarity that reduces regional imbalances. However, the German federal system comes at the price according to Detterbeck: limited autonomy for Länder leads to lack of territorial diversity and consensus politics lead to slow adaptation to new challenges and hollows out party competition.

The trend towards more centralisation is not only seen in Germany, but also in Switzerland, although to a lesser degree. While the German federal system provides limited diversity, the Swiss model has been design to preserve and protect diversity. According to Willi Haag the fundamental principle of the Swiss confederation is the principle of subsidiarity and the advantage of the Swiss confederalism is that it provides participatory rights to all three levels of the state. It also provides the rights of the people to vote, to elect and be elected, to submit initiatives, to request a referendum, to petition and to a hearing.

The principle of subsidiarity also implies, as provided by the Swiss Constitution, that the Confederation only undertakes tasks that are beyond the means of the Cantons or which require uniform regulation by the Confederation. It only holds those powers that are specifically assigned to it in the Constitution and those powers that the Constitution does not assign to the Confederation remain with the Cantons. The Confederation adopts definitive law or the Confederation adopts framework law with latitude for the Cantons. Powers of the Confederation are typical for any federal level and they include foreign and security policy, customs and currency, defence, legislation applicable nationwide, territorial planning, law on debt enforcement and bankruptcy and environmental law. However, the responsibility to implement most of the federal laws lies with the cantons. The Constitution provides that the Confederation respects the Cantons’ autonomy.

Unlike entities of Belgium, Swiss Cantons have their own constitutions. They also have their governments and courts, which according to Haag gives them organisational sovereignty. They also have financial and fiscal sovereignty
and their powers include education, schools, healthcare, police and justice, social affairs, building etc. Swiss federal model provides coordination instruments and institutional arrangements that include: consultation procedure (Cantons’ opinion on Confederation’s legislative initiative, which means that Cantons participate in the law making procedures), conference of the cantonal government of Switzerland (inter-cantonal cooperation and coordination which provides better representation of the cantonal interests vis-à-vis the Confederation), inter-cantonal agreements (conventions, concordats, etc.)\textsuperscript{18}. Municipalities cover the political local-government bodies, the school authorities, the citizens’ communes and corporation of citizens’ communes and the local corporation. There are two types of Organisational forms of municipalities: municipalities with citizens’ assemblies and municipalities with parliaments. Municipalities also have Councils and Audit/control committees.

According to Haag strongly decentralised Switzerland with its “bottom up” organisation has a long tradition and has been successful and accepted by its peoples. It facilitates genuine participation and codetermination. However, the Swiss federal model has not remained unchanged, especially in the last 20-30 years. As Haag puts it, globalisation has been reducing the significance of the boundary lines between Cantons and Municipalities and solving problems and distribution of tasks between the Confederation, the Cantons and Municipalities have become more complex and difficult. The Swiss federal model has several challenges that might be difficult to overcome in the future. According to Haag, the first challenge lies in the limitation on the cantons’ capacity to control and act. Substantive regulatory sovereignty is shifting towards the Confederation and represents the biggest danger for federalism and devolution. The second challenge comes from the international environment. Haag argues that international environment declines relative importance of sovereignty with increasing importance of international law, thus the role of federalism and democratic participation is being reduced. Haag concludes that decentralization can only function if tasks, powers, responsibilities and finances are at same level too. A clear assignment of powers between different levels strengthens decentralisation.

Federalisation of most of the countries has been done gradually and Belgium has not been an exception. Creation of federal institutional architecture in Belgium was done through the process of six state reforms that begun in 1970 and finished in 2014. Most of federal countries (Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Germany, etc.) allow their entities to have their own constitutions, where their organisational and institutional foundations are being laid. However, this is not the case with Belgium. Through the process of federalisation of Belgium, regions and communities were granted constitutive autonomy allowing them to determine how
their institutions, governments and parliaments would be organised and function. It was only in the sixth state reform that the Brussels region acquired constitutive autonomy getting the freedom to decide on some aspects of the organisation and functioning of its institutions. A case in point would be the allocation of seats in the Parliament of the Brussels Capital Region, which was imposed by the federal government. The number of seats allocated by the federal government was not proportional to the number of Dutch speaking group and the French-speaking group in Brussels, and as such does not follow the basic liberal principles of equality and non-discrimination. The mechanisms protecting the Dutch-speaking minority in Brussels therefore involve a deviation from a basic to a more complex form of public representation.

The study of the Brussels Capital Region, but also Cyprus and the Northern Ireland is important for understanding commonalities and challenges that divided societies face according to Loizides. There are three important concepts and lessons relevant to divided societies. The first is the question of proportionality vs. disproportionally, for example allocation of seats in the Parliament of the Brussels capital region in favour of the Dutch Speakers. Loizides argues that it is not unusual for a federal country and divided societies to derive from the one-vote principle, but that the question is how to justify it, especially in the countries like the United Kingdom with very traditional political culture. On the one hand, the principle may help preserve the United Kingdom as whole, but on the other hand, people might not find it familiar and may think that this is not the traditional way of how the politics have been done in the UK. The second issue according to Loizides refers to the complex constitutional design. Societies, going though transition from centralisation to some kind of form of decentralisation, will be faced with many complexities of new arrangements. This brings us to the question of cascading and the idea that in federal countries autonomy is being granted to a minority, which then becomes a majority that provides protection to minorities. The Brussels Capital Region in that sense has a broader implication according to Loizides. And finally, there is the issue of formal vs. informal institutions. To what extent intensity of devolution has to have basis in law, or can it be developed in a more informal way? For Loizides, there is the urgency to create formal institutions in deeply divided societies, because different sides in deeply divided societies do not trust each other. The lack of trust pushes the conflict and forces the need to develop formal institutions. This is not directly link to what we might be seeing in the United Kingdom, as the UK could not be characterised as deeply divided society such as for example Bosnia and Herzegovina, so there is much more space
for informal institutions in the United Kingdom. Even in the case of Cyprus, some informal institutions have been created within the Parliament such as various technical committees that not necessarily have legal status, but can be very effective for consociational structures according to Loizides.

And as a final remark, Loizides raised the issue of how constituent state can be created. When looking at the Cyprus experience, he argues that the fact that both sides originally committed to the federal arrangement was what kept Cyprus on the agenda as a society that would reunite one day even though it might take more than 40 years. If we look at the counter example of Ukraine, there was the rejection of the federal arrangement from the very beginning. Today, only few people talk about reunification of Ukraine. In the case of Cyprus because the main political parties signed up for the idea of the federal Cyprus, the idea of reunited Cyprus has been kept alive regardless of all the failures to reach the agreement over the years.

How can societies learn from each other? Loizides concludes that in the case of Cyprus, the international experiences of divided societies have not been taken into consideration, which can partially explain why the Cyprus question has not been resolved yet.

Towards More Federal UK: Devolution to and of England

According to Lord Glasman the British political system differs from traditions in other states; it is built on the principle of the balance of interests and national sovereignty. The United Kingdom as a colonial power created many federations abroad, however as Loizides rightly points, it did not create one at home. Adrian Pabst reminds that while Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland have been part of the devolution debate in the United Kingdom, England has been excluded. Devolution debate and settling of the “English issue” in the process need to take two important questions into consideration according to Meg Russell. The first question is whether there should be representation at all England level or at sub-England level/sub-regional level. The second question is whether there should be English representation at Westminster or whether separate institutions should be formed in England should form. Although there has been no practical model developed so far, there are diverging views between the ideas of all-England vs. sub-England and between Westminster vs. outside of Westminster institutions. Therefore, it is important to include in the devolution debate models that have been developed in other devolving powers and regions. According to Russell the idea of the English Parliament has existed for quite some time, but as English were
not crying out for a need to have their own parliament, there was no settlement for the issue. The idea has become more voiced by some after the establishment of the devolved assemblies in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Although the Campaign for an English Parliament was set up in 1998, it has never been developed in detailed on how the Parliament might look like, where would its seat be and how it would be financed. A new energy, according to Russell, was put into debate with demands for the Scottish referendum on independence and following the statement by then Prime Minister David Cameron who declared: “We have heard the voice of Scotland — and now the millions of voices of England must also be heard.” At the party level, there have been several proposals for the English issue. The UKIP demanded abolishing of the House of Lords and creation of the English Parliament, which would put England, Wales, Scotland and the Northern Ireland on the same footing. They claim that what is good enough for Scotland is good enough for England. Labour party has proposed the introduction of a minister for England, suggesting that its preference is also creating separate institutions in England.

Russell also emphasises the importance of Brexit negotiation in the devolution debate in the United Kingdom. While Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales have their representations to protect their interests in the negotiation process, the question, raised by some voices, is who will speak for England. For Carr-West Brexit is likely to create tensions between the central government, devolved entities and counties.

Although the idea of the English Parliament has not been clearly defined yet, there are two distinct models according to Russell. First is the creation of new parliament such as in other regions, with its own government and the second is more pragmatic gradualist British solution is English-only formation of Westminster, which would be built on existing structures and the House of Lords as federal chamber. There are several important issues that need to be taken into consideration: the questions of asymmetry (has asymmetry in the UK gone too far?), electoral system (Should an English Parliament be separately elected, or should it be composed of English members of the House of Commons holding a dual mandate?), location/seat (Where should a seat of an English Parliament sit? Should it be based at Westminster, either in the House of Commons or House of Lords chamber, or locations outside London), the question of powers and competencies (What powers should an English Parliament have? Should they be equivalent to the powers of the Scottish Parliament, or should an English Parliament be responsible for everything except foreign affairs and defence), the question of resources and financing (how should an English Parliament be financed and what would be the funding model?). Russell concludes that devolution agreement is what holds
the union together, and although there is not so much support for the English Parliament, it is higher than for regionalism. For Jonathan Carr-West the creation of an English parliament represents “solution in search of the problem.”

While some argue that the growing English identity among the population may be a more favourable factor for creating separate institutions in England, the Parliament included, Glasman claims that the perception of identity of English people is more embodied with the local and county identities rather than with England. The survey on the perception of belonging conducted with over 5,000 participants in England showed the importance of the county and regional identities and the strong attachment to some regions; for example in Kent people tend to identify more with the region than with England. Glasman argues that the borders of constituent units should be drawn close to borders of 1530, and that the bigger role should be given to counties.

As for the devolution of England, John Denham emphasises that England as largest part of country was left unchanged after devolution reforms, so the question that one needs to pose is: devolution from what? Devolution implies transfer of powers from the central state. But, as Denham rightly points, England does not have a state; England is according to him “the oldest nation state that does not have a state.” Devolution process of Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland differs from the devolution in England, as the powers were transferred leaping over the English national level, i.e. devolution took place directly from the UK state to English sub-areas. The creation of regional administration and government according to Denham has little to do with devolution, but more with challenges of delivering centralised policies in a centralised state. English regional administrations were created for at least two reasons: firstly, certain types of EU funds required regional structures in place and secondly, some central government policies could only be implemented through decentralised institutions. Taking into consideration the number of population living in England as well as its diversity, it was necessary to create some kind of sub-national interlocutor in order to ensure that central government policies and objectives are communicated effectively. So, for Denham, this devolution was more about effective management and implementation of policies than with democracy. Conservative government took a new approach to developing things at the subnational level and in particularly combining authorities with majors. However, some argue that it is quite ambiguous that it only represents the devolution trend to the extent that it is still the central government seeking subnational ways of delivering central powers. One also needs to take into consideration, according to Denham, the existence of centralised political culture in England. So, the question is how do new emerging combining authorities and elected mayors fit in that picture and in which way? Is this a genuine devolution of power or is it a
more sophisticated approach of delivering central powers? According to Denham, there is a lot of evidence to suggest that it is the second. Mayors do not enjoy a lot of public support, and mayors outside of London are much more constrained and less influential; they do not have the executive ability and their role in decision-making is rather limited.39

According to Arianna Giovannini40, the paradox of devolution in the United Kingdom is that although it has focused mostly on the economic development and addressing inequalities, in practice it has created new divides. Devolution process in the United Kingdom is a top down process that lacks genuine participation; Giovanni argues that it could be characterised as elite to elite dialogue. Devolution deals need to be implemented properly in order to avoid fragmentation. For the most part, according to Giovannini, public was left at the margin of the process assuming that democracy comes at the later stage. While Mark Morrin41 argues that creation of metro mayors represent important move, Giovanni is of the opinion that they still lack public approval. Improving democratic accountability has not been the driving force of the devolution according to Morrin; austerity was part of motivation to save resources and increase efficiency. Most of English counties are urban and their economies are more prosperous compared to other European regions. Morrin prefers patchwork settlement to one-size-fits all models like in France, therefore the asymmetry is likely to be continued and different models can be expected.

Brexit and Devolved External Relations

Brexit will undoubtedly have important impact on devolution process in the United Kingdom. Richard Whitman42 argues that Brexit will have significant external and internal consequences for the United Kingdom. The line between internal and external competencies, especially within devolved and federalised states, has been fading. Some policy areas, which have been devolved to Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales such as agriculture, fisheries, trade and etc. according to Whiteman, have both domestic and external elements. While the Brexit negotiations cannot directly involve devolved regions, the question is how and who will represent their interests? Whiteman argues that the institutional arrangement created for decision-making between the United Kingdom and devolved regions is not suited to represent interests of devolved regions. While there is a need to search for common position in the Brexit negotiations, especially bearing in mind that the devolved regions voted differently in the EU referendum, the current Prime Minister has only relied on Westminster’s position.43 Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland seek to develop international profile different from
the UK. Scotland has developed a paradiplomatic presence in Brussels and some other capitals. However, Whiteman argues that the British Foreign Service does not have resources to concentrate on devolved foreign affairs. He also argues that political rhetoric from Scotland indicates that Scotland will likely want its powers back. But the question is whether it will have the capacity and resources to exercise those powers. Whiteman concludes that with Brexit, there is likelihood that a different phase of devolution in UK will take place, which will require a bottom up approach and more of democratic accountability.

According to Nicholas Whyte the current system does not work as the devolved units are kept out of negotiations. Scotland has worked on developing international profile; it has four representation offices abroad and its first minister has been quite active internationally. While Scotland, as Whyte argues, is far away from independence, there are many evidence to suggest that there is very little trust between the Scottish Government and the Foreign Office. Northern Ireland, on the other hand, has the advantage of having an ally who is a EU member state, but it lacks internal political will compared to Scotland. According to Whyte, the key question for Northern Ireland in Brexit negotiation deal would be whether a soft border and hard Brexit is possible at the same time.

**Federal Devolution in a Comparative Perspective**

What are the lessons that can be drawn from other devolving powers and federal countries? How and to what extent they are relevant to the United Kingdom? According to Clive Grace, it is important to take into consideration the specific context of a country and its historic and cultural particularities, when applying existing federal or devolution models. In other words, these federal solutions need to be adapted to the specificities of the United Kingdom. Decentralisation also requires internal consent and having on board the public, but also the central and local authorities. According to Grace, decentralisation should not be treated as the goal, but as the process. Devolution has to be implemented properly and some of the precondition for its successful implementation include resources, good coordination, monitoring and stable fiscal arrangement. Grace draws four important lessons for devolution to and of England: firstly, there has to be a clear narrative change coupled from the pressure from the below (in case of England it is not clear what that narrative is); secondly, there has to be the alignment between the powers that are granted, the resources and the capacity, and the territorial integrity; thirdly, inclusion (women, the poor people and the minorities) represents important factor that needs to be taken into consideration and finally, decentralisation is both a process and an event, and as such it represents strategic opportunism.
Devolution is a very effective mechanism dealing with divided societies if it is managed properly. According to Feargal Cochrane, the example of the power-sharing model of Northern Ireland demonstrates that there is a polarised debate about the success of devolution. Critical admirers of devolution and power-sharing model argue that there has been sufficient check and balances for it to survive and that it brought the government much closer to the people. Politics did come much closer to the ground; however, critical opponents say that devolution has incentivised the division. When devolution was set up in Northern Ireland nobody ever thought of Brexit. The EU was a sort of guarantor of the devolution according to Cochrane. External factors change the opportunity factors as the EU example clearly demonstrates. One of the impacts of Brexit is that it will potentially put again the borderline again between Ireland and the Northern Ireland.

For Detterbeck the most important factor of successful devolution is the combination of self-rule and shared rule. For the self-rule, it is important to achieve accountability, efficiency, fiscal stability and sufficient autonomy. Shared rule must be based on the principle of holding together and inclusiveness. Haag concludes that England is in special position and that devolution needs to take a different approach. Devolution process needs to be accepted by the people, i.e. it needs to be a bottom up approach that would allow for all groups concerned to take part in the development of decentralisation.
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Paolo Dardanelli, Senior Lecturer in Comparative Politics, School of Politics and International Relations, University of Kent.

Rupak Chattopadhyay, President and CEO, Forum of Federations, Canada

Ibid.

César Colino, Santander Fellow in Iberian and European Studies at the European Studies Centre (2016-2017) and Associate Professor, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Spanish Open University (UNED).

Ibid.

For example, health and education were reserved as exclusive central state powers in 10 autonomous communities up until mid 1990s.

Colino Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Klaus Detterbeck, Professor of Politics, Institut für Politikwissenschaft, University of Göttingen, Germany.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Willi Haag, former Cantonal Governor of St. Gallen.

Ibid.

Thibaud Bodson, PhD Candidate, Freie Universität Berlin.

Ibid.
21 Ibid.

22 Neophytos Loizides, Professor of International Conflict Analysis, School of Politics and International Relations, University of Kent.

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid.

26 Lord Maurice Glasman, Labour Life Peer in the House of Lords and the Director of the Common Good Foundation

27 Adrian Pabst, Reader in Politics, School of Politics and International Relations and Director of Centre for Federal Studies, University of Kent.

28 Megg Russell, Director of the Constitution Unit and Professor of British and Comparative Politics, University College London.


30 Russell Ibid.

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid.

33 Jonathan Carr-West, Chief Executive, LGiU.

34 Lord Maurice Glasman, Life Peer (Labour); Director, Common Good Foundation

35 Ibid.

36 John Denham, Professor and Director, Centre for English Identity and Politics, University of Winchester and former Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government (2009-2010)

37 Ibid.

38 Ibid.

39 Ibid.

40 Arianna Giovannini, Lecturer in Local Politics, Department of Politics and
Public Policy, DeMontford University

41 Mark Morrin, Localism Lead, RePublica think-tank.

42 Richard Whitman, Professor of Politics and International Politics and Head of School of Politics and International Relations, University of Kent.

43 Ibid.

44 Nicholas Whyte, Senior Director, global solutions, APCO, Brussels.

45 Clive Grace, Honorary Research Fellow in international public services, Cardiff Business School.

46 Feargal Cochrane, Professor of International Conflict Analysis and Director of Conflict Analysis Research Centre, School of Politics and International Relations, University of Kent.
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